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A fact from Nakba appeared on Wikipedia's Main Page in the Did you know column on 23 May 2021 (check views). The text of the entry was as follows:
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value (help)Additions/subtractions? Levivich (talk) 03:15, 22 October 2023 (UTC)
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Outline
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Full source citations at #Core sources
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A work in progress, but thoughts? Levivich (talk) 22:01, 24 October 2023 (UTC)
I'm adding to the outline links to other articles, and sub-topics (where I'm not aware of an article to link), that I think are WP:DUE per the sources listed in each outline section. Please speak up if you think anything should be added or removed. Also, as the outline will be changing, just note that folks' approval/disapproval at any given point in time may no longer apply to a later, changed version of the outline. Levivich (talk) 01:14, 28 October 2023 (UTC)
I've added article links to the history section in the outline above. If anyone thinks there are other articles that should be linked in the history section of the Nakba article, or that we shouldn't be linking to something that is listed in the outline, please let me know. Levivich (talk) 20:53, 9 November 2023 (UTC)
I've added a very small bare-bones start to the History section of the article, and struck through the links on the outline that are now in the article. My plan is to expand the history section until all the links in the outline are in the article, then move on to the other sections. I may move some links to other parts of the outline and reorganize the outline a bit as I go. Levivich (talk) 05:59, 23 November 2023 (UTC)
Hi everyone. My last addition to the article was a few lines about "infiltrators" during the 1948 Nakba. I had gathered sources/quotes for additions about "infiltrators" after the war (1949-1967) but haven't had a chance to summarize these sources/quotes into a prose addition, and RL is getting the best of me and I might not get back to this for a month or more. So in case anyone wants to pick up where I left off and add some content about post-1948 "infiltrators," here is are my potential footnotes for that addition:
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INFILTRATORS 1949-1955 ((harvnb |Manna |2022 |ps=, pp. 3 ("The sword of expulsion was a constant threat over the heads of Palestinians in the Galilee and in other areas even after the end of the war when Israeli security forces conducted a fierce campaign against attempts by refugees to return to their own villages. Israel criminalized those returnees by labeling them as “infiltrators” in order to justify its iron fist policy, which included firing indiscriminately on any refugee seen trying to return to their home or village."), 130-145 ("[p. 130] Despite the massive effort expended by the army and police to halt the occurrence of refugees attempting to return to their homes, labeled “infiltrators” by Israel, Israel’s success was only partial, since thousands returned to their homes and remain there."), 151-162 ("[p. 161] Five years after the Galilee was completely occupied, official Israeli sources estimated that about 20,500 “infiltrators” had succeeded in gaining citizenship and thus the guarantee that they would spend their lives in the country. In the same period, Israel agreed to a family reunification program for about 3,000 people. These numbers confirm that most returnees succeeded in returning through their own capabilities, despite all the dangers and Israeli policies to stem that phenomenon. The returning “infiltrators” constituted about a quarter of the population of the Galilee after the Nakba."), and 290 n. 2 ("Israeli researchers, with Morris at their head, estimate that the number of Arabs who were killed in the “border wars” and labeled as “infiltrators” was between three and five thousand individuals."))); ((harvnb |Slater |2020 |p=94 |ps=, "At the end of the 1948 war Israel decided to set up some 350 settlements along its borders, “in many cases built on the ruins of abandoned villages,” to be populated largely by the newly arrived Jewish immigrants from Europe and the Arab world. For that reason, as well as its “transfer” ideology and security concerns, the Israeli government decided to block the return of the Palestinian refugees—the survivors of the Nakba who had fled into neighboring Arab states—by any means necessary. As Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary in the summer of 1948: the return of the refugees “must be prevented . . . at all costs.” Of course, the “costs” were overwhelmingly borne by the refugees seeking to return to their villages, farms, and properties. In the early years after 1948, most of the refugees were unarmed and nonviolent; dispossessed of their homes and property, poverty stricken and even hungry, they were desperately trying to harvest their crops from the fields and orchards that had been seized by Israel. To be sure, some of them were militants or terrorists—the predecessors of the more organized Palestinian resistance forces, the “Fedayeen” or guerrilla forces of the 1950s—who sought to kill the new owners of their previous properties, or merely any Jews they encountered. Even when the “infiltrators,” as Israel called them, posed no security threats, the government’s orders to its soldiers and border police were to shoot them on sight. As a result, in the early years after the war an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 Palestinians were killed.")); ((harvnb |Rouhana |Sabbagh-Khoury |2017 |p=407 |ps=, "Under military rule, Palestinians lived in the shadow of the continuous fear of traumatic expulsion that befell the vast majority of their people, including families and friends, and in many cases themselves – as some of them sneaked back across the borders. They became aware of stories of those expelled and of those Palestinians who tried to “sneak” back to their homes and towns from across the borders, and the thousands who were shot and killed to stop their return. Indeed, Israel continued the ethnic cleansing well into the early 1950s (Masalha 1997b) and criminalized and securitized the return of refugees to their towns from across the borders. The Israeli authorities have coined a special term for this category of Palestinian refugees who tried to “sneak” back to their own homes: “infiltrators” (''mistaninim'' in Hebrew, ''mutasallileen'' in Arabic), a term carrying criminal and security connotations. This criminalization helped legitimize the immediate killing of “infiltrators” when Israeli soldiers discovered them at the borders. Sometimes these returnees were put on trucks and forced back across the borders. This criminalization was supposed to serve a triple purpose for the newly created Israeli state: deterring those who considered returning to their homes from across the borders; warning the Arab population against assisting their community members by hiding them in their houses; and increasing the fear of Palestinians among the Jewish population, thus justifying the extreme measures of simply killing these refugees.")); ((harvnb |Rouhana |Sabbagh-Khoury |2014 |p=7 |ps=, "In conjunction with (and total contrast to) the Law of Return and the active and sometimes aggressive recruitment of Jewish citizens of other countries as immigrants (or even non-Jewish immigrants who have family relations to Jews), Palestinians who were expelled or who left under the duress of war were prohibited from returning to their homes or to any other place in the country (except for a few thousand cases of family reunification under strict conditions). Those who tried to return from across the borders after the ceasefire were considered ‘infiltrators’, and in thousands of cases, they were killed while en route to their homes. These steps guaranteed that the reversal of the demographic composition of the country by force of law was completed early in the military rule period.")); ((harvnb |Manna |2013 |pp=92-93 |ps=, "Many Palestinian refugees did not give up the hope of going back to their homes and properties after the end of the war, and tried to return to their original localities. They crossed the new borders erected in the aftermath of 1948 in an attempt to go back to their homes and lands. About [p. 93] 20,000 succeeded in their mission, particularly in the Galilee, and thus spared their families the humiliation of exile in the refugee camps. However, many more failed to make it and a few thousand Palestinians paid dearly with their lives in their attempts to return to their homes. The Israeli policy was extremely harsh with respect to Palestinians who “infiltrated” the borders of the newly established Jewish state, which had a clear interest in preventing the enlargement of its Arab minority. The partial expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland was complemented by the Israeli policy of transfer ''ex post facto''. Hundreds of Arab villages in Israel were destroyed and on many of them new Jewish settlements were established. As a result of these measures, the stream of Palestinian returnees dried up from the mid-1950’s on. Since then, second and third Palestinian generation of refugees have been born in the camps of exile.")); ((harvnb |Masalha |2012 |pp=230-231)); ((harvnb |Davis |2011 |p=218 |ps=, "After 1948 and through the early 1950s, people found ways to go back to their villages. Not many attempted this, but some did, and the cost was high. Some succeeded in returning permanently to live inside Israel, but for most, their goals were to get the crops, provisions, and possessions they had left behind and to visit the family members who had remained. Many were killed on these cross-border infiltrations, which served to discourage all but the most daring, and these returns predated the military raids of the Palestinian resistance some years later.")); ((harvnb |Shlaim |2009 |pp=85-90 |ps=, "[p. 85] The conventional (Israeli) view is that Palestinian infiltration into Israel was aided and abetted by the Arab governments, following the defeat of their regular armies on the battlefield; that it was a form of undeclared guerrilla warfare designed to weaken and even destroy the infant Jewish state; that Israel was thus the innocent victim of Arab provocation and Arab aggression; and that its military reprisals were legitimately undertaken in self-defence. The evidence gleaned by Morris from Israeli, British, American and UN archives - Arab governments do not, as a rule, open their archives to research - suggests that infiltration into Israel was a direct consequence of the displacement and dispossession of over 700,000 Palestinians in the course of the Palestine War, and that the motives behind it were [p. 86] largely economic and social rather than political. Many of the infiltrators were Palestinian refugees whose reasons for crossing the border included looking for relatives, returning to their homes, recovering possessions, tending their fields, harvesting and, occasionally, exacting revenge. Some of the infiltrators were thieves and smugglers; some were involved in the hashish convoys; others were nomadic Bedouins, more accustomed to grazing rights than to state borders. There were acts of terror and politically motivated raids, such as those organised by the ex-Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, and financed by Saudi Arabia, but they did not amount to very much. In the period 1949-56 as a whole, 90 per cent or more of all infiltrations, in Morris’s estimate, were motivated by economic and social concerns. As the years went by, a certain overlap developed between economic infiltration and political infiltration geared to killing and injuring Israelis. The 'free-fire’ policy adopted by the Israeli army, border guard and police in dealing with suspects - a policy of shooting first and asking questions later - contributed to this overlap. Faced with trigger-happy Israeli soldiers, infiltrators started coming in organised bands and responding in kind.")); ((harvnb |Shlaim |2009 |p=86 |ps=, "Altogether between 2,700 and 5,000 infiltrators were killed in the period 1949-56, the great majority of them unarmed.")); ((harvnb |Shlaim |2009 |p=89 |ps=, "To cope with this threat Israel established new settlements along the borders and razed abandoned Arab villages. Israeli units began patrolling the borders, laying ambushes, sowing mines and setting booby-traps. The ‘free-fire’ policy towards infiltrators was adopted. Periodic search operations were also mounted in Arab villages inside Israel to weed out infiltrators. Intermittendy, the soldiers who carried out these operations committed acts of brutality, among them gang rape, the murder of civilians, and the dumping of 120 suspected infiltrators in the Arava desert without water.")); ((harvnb |Humphries |Khalili |2007 |pp=219-220 |ps=, "In the early years, while the Lebanese–Galilee border remained fairly porous, the trip was fraught with dangers, as the Israelis fought ferociously against returning refugees. Those caught faced expulsion, detention, or even being killed as “infiltrators.”")); ((harvnb |Morris |2004 |p=508 |ps=, "As with other sites, so with Bir‘im, the authorities feared that, through infiltration, the village would soon fill up and cease to be ‘abandoned’.27 In June 1949, they removed the last Arabs from Bir‘im – the ten original guards and a handful who had joined them – and transferred them to Jish.28 At the same time, a group of Jews settled in Bir‘im’s houses (in August 1950 they moved to a permanent site, designated Kibbutz Bar‘am, on the village’s lands) – ‘and members of this kibbutz began to behave toward our property and our land as if they were the true owners’, the villagers later complained.29 On 27 April 1949, the government issued regulations, based on the Mandatory Emergency Regulations, empowering the defence minister to declare a border area a ‘security zone’, enabling him to bar anyone from entry. In September, the Lebanese border area was declared such a zone.30 This legalised the previous months’ operations. For decades thereafter, the refugees of Bir‘im (in Jish and Lebanon), Iqrit (in Rama) and Mansura (in Lebanon) pleaded with Israel to be [p. 509] permitted to return to their homes. They were supported by Shitrit and Ben-Zvi, president of Israel from 1952 to 1963. They also appealed to the High Court of Justice. On 31 July 1951, the High Court ruled in favour of the return of the Iqrit refugees to their village. But the IDF continued to obstruct a return.")); ((harvnb |Morris |2004 |p=509 |ps=, "As to Bir‘im, in 25 February 1952 the High Court ruled in favour of the state, though it allowed that the initial eviction had not been completely legal. Here, too, the IDF continued to block a return and new settlements were established on the two villages’ lands. The settlements joined the IDF and GSS in lobbying against a return. The defense establishment argued that a return would harm border security, pave the way for infiltrators and serve as a precedent; the settlements, that a return, or an endorsement of the refugees’ claims to lands, would undermine their existence. During 1949–1953, natural erosion, the set- tlers and the IDF gradually levelled the villages. On 24 December 1951 – Christmas eve – the IDF razed what remained of Iqrit with explosives; on 16 and 17 September 1953, using fighter-bombers and sappers, the IDF leveled Bir‘im. In Iqrit, only the church was left standing, in Bir‘im, the ancient synagogue. Since then, no one has returned to the two sites.")); ((harvnb |Morris |2004 |p=509 |ps=, "The case of Bir‘im, Iqrit and Mansura illustrates how deep was the IDF’s determination from November 1948 onward to create and main- tain a northern border ‘security belt’ clear of Arabs. That determina- tion quickly spread to the civilian institutions of state, particularly those concerned with immigrant absorption and settlement. Immediately after Hiram, Weitz and other executives began planning settlements in the border strip and exempted them from the ‘surplus lands’ requirement; indeed, in their planning, they tended to ‘widen’ the strip to a depth of 10–15 kilometres. However, Kaplan and Cisling, while accepting the IDF’s arguments, insisted that the evictees should be properly and comfortably resettled. Only Minority Affairs Ministry director general Machnes opposed the principle of an Arab-less border strip.")); ((harvnb |Morris |2004 |ps=, pp. 510-517 ("[p. 510] But the military periodically raided the full and half-empty Galilee villages to weed out illegal returnees, dubbed ‘infiltrators’ ... In the course of 1949, the IDF repeatedly raided the villages, sorted out legal from illegal residents and, usually, expelled returnees ... [p. 513] Ben-Gurion personally authorised the expulsion of the infiltrating returnees at a meeting with General Avner at the beginning of 1949. Ben-Gurion was later to say that he viewed the infiltration problem ‘through the barrel of a gun’ ... [p. 514] But infiltrators continued to return ... [p. 515] After being shoved into the West Bank, many expellees infiltrated back ... Another officer thought he had a solution, after pointing out that ‘almost all’ those expelled – all adult males – from one village, ‘Ibillin, had since returned: ‘We have not yet heard of any case in which a whole family of expellees has returned. It is clear, therefore, that the expulsion of whole families better assures their non-return.’ ... [p. 517] The search and expulsion operations in the Galilee continued during the following months [after mid-February 1949].") and 535 ("But where politics did not interfere, the army’s desire for Arab-clear borders was generally decisive. Arab villages along the border meant problems in terms of infiltration, espionage and sabotage. When the villages were semi-abandoned, as was generally the case, it meant a continuous return and resettlement in the empty houses, thus consolidating the Arab presence in the area and increasing their numbers in the country. To this was added the interest of the Jewish agricultural and settlement bodies in more land and settlement sites and the interest of the various government ministries (health, finance, minorities) to be rid of the burden of economically problematic, desolate, semi-abandoned villages. These interests generally dovetailed.")); ((harvnb |Morris |2004 |p=536 |ps=, "Excluding the Negev beduin, it is probable that the number of Arabs kicked out of, or persuaded to leave, the country in the border-clearing operations and in the internal anti-infiltration sweeps during 1948–1950 was around 20,000. If one includes expelled northern Negev beduin, the total may have been as high as 30,000–40,000.")); INFILTRATORS 1956-1967 ((harvnb |Kimmerling |2008 |pp=162-164 |ps=, "[p. 162] The Doctrine of Preemptive War, 1956–1967[:] By refusing to deal with the problem of uprooted Palestinians concentrated in refugee camps in surrounding countries, Israel was exposed to [p. 163] increasing Palestinian infiltration activities. The infiltrations slowly devel- oped into a kind of guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity, mainly against civilians settled in frontier settlements established on “abandoned” Arab lands and filled with new immigrants. To Israel, the authorities of the Arab states from where the infiltrators came were responsible for the infiltra- tions, and Israel responded with an escalating series of retaliations and reprisals against military and civilian targets in Arab countries.37 This pe- riod, labeled by Benny Morris38 as the period of “Israel’s border wars” had several consequences.")); ((harvnb |Shalhoub-Kevorkian |2017 |p=348 |ps=, "The newly established Israeli state ruled over the Palestinian citizens first through military rule and by instilling fear in people through a portrayal of the government as an “all seeing, all-knowing” (Korn 2000). Through a network of paid agents and informers, the state invoked a heavy sense of fear when and while rewarding those who cooperated and punishing those who did not. The surveillance of the military government imposed restrictions on movements and criminalized some Palestinians, resulting in the increase of conviction rates against them (ibid.). This machinery of surveillance also resulted in the creation of different segments of Palestinians and different categories of residents. They were, for example: “evacuees” – those who were evicted by the Israeli state from their homes, villages, and cities; “infiltrators” – those who “illegally” returned to within the newly established state’s borders in an effort to return to their homes; and “present absentees” – those who had the misfortune to be absent from their homes and lands during the population census carried out in 1948, and thus were banned from returning to their homes, but nonetheless remained in the country.")); |
So if anybody wants to read all of that and summarize it, thanks :-) Levivich (talk) 23:45, 23 March 2024 (UTC)
There is ongoing debate among historians and analysts regarding how to characterize what happened during the Nakba. Labeling it 'ethnic cleansing' is a loaded term risking bias. We're better off depicting it as a displacement event while fully sourcing the range of perspectives - to avoid inflaming this controversial topic. Our role is capturing views accurately, not taking sides. OliveTree39 (talk) 15:27, 3 April 2024 (UTC)
@OliveTree39: with reference the added disputed tag, please explain why this has been added and with reference to reliable sources, as you were asked for previously. Thank you. Selfstudier (talk) 12:19, 4 April 2024 (UTC)
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Let me copy over to this page what the body of the article currently says about "ethnic cleansing":
The Nakba is described as ethnic cleansing by many scholars,[1] including Palestinian scholars such as Rashid Khalidi,[2] Adel Manna,[3] Nur Masalha,[4] Nadim Rouhana,[5] Ahmad H. Sa'di,[6] and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury,[7] Israeli scholars such as Alon Confino,[8] Amos Goldberg,[9] Baruch Kimmerling,[10] Ronit Lentin,[11] Ilan Pappé,[12] and Yehouda Shenhav,[13] and foreign scholars such as Abigail Bakan,[14] Elias Khoury,[15] Mark Levene,[16] Derek Penslar,[17] and Patrick Wolfe,[18] among other scholars.[19]
Other scholars, such as Yoav Gelber,[20] Benny Morris,[21] and Seth J. Frantzman,[22] disagree that the Nakba constitutes an ethnic cleansing.
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For those counting along, that's 24 different bona-fide scholars (17 wiki-notable), all 21st century peer-reviewed academic works. On top of those 24, there are 7 other scholars (in 21st c. peer-reviewed academic works) that don't use the term in their own voice, but recognize that the term is widely used by scholars. A total of 31 21st-century peer-reviewed academic works saying it's ethnic cleansing. And they come from Palestinian, Israeli and non-Palestinian, non-Israeli scholars.
OliveTree, what you have posted so far to rebut this is:
These sources do not demonstrate any significant modern dispute among scholars about this. You'd need to bring like dozens of 21st century peer reviewed academic works in order to show that the 31 works cited in the Wikipedia article right now do not represent the mainstream view. Levivich (talk) 16:01, 4 April 2024 (UTC)
Should we have an RFC on this to be thorough? IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 16:40, 4 April 2024 (UTC)
This recent edit added that "at least 15,000 Arabs had been killed."[2] [3]
References
This information (the death toll) is much needed but I doubt these sources are sufficient. This should be discussed. @ThePaganUK. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 21:25, 8 April 2024 (UTC)
@User:IOHANNVSVERVS Will do some digging and add more refs shortly. Cheers.ThePaganUK (talk) 11:16, 9 April 2024 (UTC)
It seems like the 15,000 number refers to total Arab dead in the 1948 Palestine war, including Arab League soldiers. See this discussion. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 22:15, 13 April 2024 (UTC)
I don't think July 20, 1949 is the end date of the Nakba per the body of the article (or mainstream RS view). Maybe it should be "1947-present." Which also implicates whether the article says "The Nakba was" or "The Nakba is."
For that matter I'm not entirely sure about 1947 being the start date either. Maybe "early 20th c. to present." Maybe the infobox shouldn't have dates at all.
Thoughts? Levivich (talk) 01:17, 9 April 2024 (UTC)
Media and what I'll casually call Palestinian-sympathetic sources (eg. [2] have currently been using the term Nakba (specifically "second Nakba") to describe current events. What level of media coverage (and general public terminology) is required for the page to mention this, and at what point would that warrant changing the infobox by removing an end date? Are the current news articles being published enough? Nyonyatwelve (talk) 02:20, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
“The term is also used to described” should be “The term is also used to describe” but I can’t change it cuz page is protected 129.22.21.195 (talk) 03:50, 24 April 2024 (UTC)
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This entire article solely describes the Palestinian narrative which at best contains half truths and totally disregards many facts such as how the 1948 war started and by whom, the genocidal attack on Jews, why were the Arabs in Gaza labeled as refugees by Egypt, and much more. People read this as comprehensive truth when it clearly isn’t. This entire topic should be re-edited to reflect full facts. Otherwise you need to clarify that this whole article is based on Palestinian narrative. ZZ1960 (talk) 08:50, 24 April 2024 (UTC)
The article says, "The Nakba is described as ethnic cleansing by many scholars, including Palestinian scholars .... Israeli scholars... " while I would agree to separate it based on citizenship status rather than by ethnicity (so we don't have Arab vs. Jewish scholars), by that standard some of the Palestinians are misclassified because they are Israeli citizens rather than citizens of Palestine. Perhaps this could be clarified by rewriting, such as separating Israeli-Jews from Palestinian or Palestinian descent—I think Khalidi is a US citizen for example. Or perhaps I'm just splitting hairs here. (t · c) buidhe 04:32, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
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In regards to the section "Terminology", the description of the origin of the term is presented in an exceedingly misleading manner, which causes such a souring of the orignal term that the entire article has become biased towards a narrative and not factual truth. A closer inspection of the same posted source (Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq) shows that the term was created here not to describe any kind of ethnic cleansing committed by the "Zionist enemy" (Israel) but an embarassment created by and caused by the Arab forces themselves: "Seven Arab countries declare war on Zionism in Palestine….Seven countries go to war to abolish the partition and to defeat Zionism, and quickly leave the battle after losing much of the land of Palestine – and even the part that was given to the Arabs in the Partition Plan". He goes on, "We must admit our mistakes…and recognize the extent of our responsibility for the disaster that is our lot."
It is important that Zyrayq is the originator of this term and not biased towards the Israeli state, making statements anti-Zionist statements in the same text. The true flavor of the origin of this term must be mentioned as it currently biasing the entire article towards factual error. 142.157.224.197 (talk) 22:07, 5 May 2024 (UTC)
Please present the request in the form Change X to Y together with a reference. Argumentation is not necessary, EC editors will decide whether to implement it.Selfstudier (talk) 22:18, 5 May 2024 (UTC)