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Evaluative diversity (also known as moral diversity) is the degree to which different decision-makers in a population exhibit preferences for different forms of evaluation. Unlike race, gender, sexual orientation, and disability, evaluative diversity does not yet enjoy legal protected status.[1]
The term "evaluative diversity" is attributed to a 1961 paper by P. F. Strawson.[2][3] Antonio Cua referred to Strawson's concept of evaluative diversity as "the region of conflicting ideal images of man, the region of moral diversity."[4] Evaluative diversity includes differences of moral sensibility[5]--as an example, Richard Brandt observed that the Hopi people did not share his moral qualms about killing birds by tying them to strings and playing rough with them[6]--yet one may prefer the term "evaluative diversity" over "moral diversity" because different philosophers disagree about which kinds of values qualify as moral. [7]
Studies comparing different kinds of diversity find that moral diversity is even more socially divisive than ethnic diversity.[8][9] Other studies indicate that such value differences correlate with biological differences including genes and brain-activation patterns.[10]