Texas City refinery explosion is currently a Computing and engineering good article nominee. Nominated by JudeFawley (talk) at 16:02, 29 February 2024 (UTC) An editor has placed this article on hold to allow improvements to be made to satisfy the good article criteria. Recommendations have been left on the review page, and editors have seven days to address these issues. Improvements made in this period will influence the reviewer's decision whether or not to list the article as a good article. Short description: 2005 deadly refinery accident |
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I recommend the following improvements to this article:
1) Is there a source to confirm that a carburetor was the source of the explosion? I doubt that a truck on site at the refinery used a carburetor. Perhaps fuel injector is more appropriate, but "fuel system" would be preferred if the actual source is unknown.
2) The comparison to Chernobyl seems superfluous and illegitimate. It is not explained, nor was any evidence found in the US Chemical Safety Board's animation. I will be removing this.
3) Language explaining the actual ignition at the truck seems contrived. I'm not the one to do it, but let's clean it up with more technical phrasing.
4) Incorporation of the following article into the accident description:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070320/ap_on_bi_ge/bp_plant_explosion
All in all, this seems to be a description of the explosion more than the refinery. Perhaps the explosion section should be moved to it's own article.
--67.176.29.1 22:05, 25 March 2007 (UTC)
The 'Subsequent incidents' section includes the 2008 death of William Joseph Gracia. The following section begins 'Following these additional safety incidents, on 17-Aug-2005'. This does not make sense. An event in 2005 cannot occur following a 2008 event.
All other incidents mentioned in this section occurred pre-August 2005. Furthermore, these other incidents are all "process safety" incidents. The subsequent section deals specifically with process safety incidents.
The simplest solution is to remove the William Joseph Gracia incident. Sad as such incidents are, this particular industrial accident is not notable and is not presented in context. I will remove this from the article. - Crosbiesmith (talk) 19:25, 3 July 2009 (UTC)
Concern on the name: As a general rule an article name should either
This event is so recent I am not sure there is any particular name that has firmly stuck to it. And, regardless, I don't know that it can really be said that the average person knowledgeable about events in Texas City would recognize this title as uniquely referring to the 2005 event as opposed to the 1947 event or event the 2009 event. Even the term "Texas City refinery", though most commonly used to refer to the BP refinery can be used with others.
I would propose amending the title to specifically include the year in order to disambiguate it.
--Mcorazao (talk) 20:38, 17 May 2010 (UTC)
On the first paragraph of "Subsequent incidents" where it is mentioned that: "... a contractor had accidentally switched a carbon steel pipe elbow with a low alloy steel elbow..." should not it be the otherway around, which is "a low alloy steel elbow had been accidentally replaced by a carbon steel one"? The thing is low alloy steels are used for example in vapor power plants main steam lines where temperatures are easilly higher than 500ºC and pressure is easilly higher than 300 bar. So, this means we are on the presence of High Temperature Hydrogen Attack characteristics:
In the upper section it says the explosion was ignited by a contractor's pickup truck as the engine was left running. Farther down it says he had to crank the engine several times and at first the truck would not start. Now was the engine running or was it off? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.224.238.107 (talk) 19:23, 11 February 2012 (UTC)
This Texas City Refinery article does not do justice to the excellent narrative detailed in the CBS investigation report (REPORT NO. 2005-04-I-TX) of 2007. It does not describe in any detail the conflicts and the mistakes made during the 23rd, March 2005 and as a reference it is inadequate. Compare with the timeline narrative as detailed in Piper Alpha and you can see that one of the most infamous accidents in U.S. history has been poorly served to date. I feel there is too much focus on detail (car engine discussions etc) when the main narrative is incomplete and needs much more work. I can update the 'Explosion' section but I would need to delete the existing text, not sure if you all are OK with this. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Blackrock36 (talk • contribs) 08:44, 22 April 2013 (UTC)
Hello to whomever is watching this talk page. I have several minor updates I would like to suggest for this article. Before I detail the requests, I would like to point out that I am an employee of BP and am asking for these changes on behalf of the company as part of my job. If any editors here have been involved in discussion on the main BP article's talk page, then you have likely seen me there.
Now, here are the updates I suggest for this article. Both of the following suggestions are for the introduction of the article.
Please let me know if you have any questions. Again these are just suggestions. Thanks. Arturo at BP (talk) 20:14, 10 May 2013 (UTC)
Was on youtube today and came across this video about the incident, made by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goSEyGNfiPM Now my basic understanding is that such a video may be in public domain in the united states? Could be it be added to the article? Macktheknifeau (talk) 09:03, 26 June 2021 (UTC)
Having read the page and watched the video, I'm puzzled by the discrepancies between the two.
One of the more glaring differences relates to the pickup truck that is believed to have triggered the actual explosion. The video describes this as having been parked with two workers inside it (with engine idling) and notes that those workers attempted to stop the racing engine, but the page text instead has the pejorative words "A diesel pick-up truck, with its engine left idling, had been carelessly parked..." and says that nearby workers attempted to stop the racing engine. I've looked in the CSB report (which is cited as the basis for this particular paragraph) and it makes no mention of "carelessly parked", nor of any attempts to stop the engine by those in it or nearby.
There are several other differences that I'm not going to attempt to list here. Questions for anyone familiar with the incident and/or this page would include: is the CSB video regarded as definitive? is the CSB report regarded as definitive? why does this page contain at least one pejorative statement which doesn't seem to be present in the cited source? Smudgeface (talk) 20:29, 30 October 2022 (UTC)
GA toolbox |
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Reviewing |
Nominator: JudeFawley (talk · contribs) 16:02, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
Reviewer: Elli (talk · contribs) 17:37, 4 April 2024 (UTC)
I'll take a look at this one. Should have a full review within a week. Elli (talk | contribs) 17:37, 4 April 2024 (UTC)
After Pan American merged with Standard Oil of Indiana, ownership passed to Amoco.[2]This is worded a bit confusingly, maybe go with "Pan American merged with Standard Oil of Indiana in 1954 to form Amoco" or something similar.
but BP were extremely successful in turning the tideshouldn't this be "BP was"?
At the time of the merger, the plant was losing moneygiven that the previous paragraph mentions multiple mergers, maybe do "At the time of the 1999 merger"
It emerged after the accident that the plant had been poorly maintained for several years.[10]given what else is written in this section, it seems like this was known at the time as well.
Disposal of hydrocarbon vapors and small amounts of associated liquids from vent and relief during plant upsets or planned shutdowns was to vessel F-20, a blowdown stack.would reword -- maybe like "Excess hydrocarbon vapors and liquids were sent to vessel F-20, a blowdown stack."
Construction, turnaround, and routine activities at the refinery often required the installation of trailers and portable buildings for use as offices, workshops, etc. for the use of employees and contract workers.would go with something more like "Portable buildings and trailers were often installed for use as offices during construction and maintenance."
established the agreed layout of trailers"agreed" with who?
actions arising from the double-wide trailer MOC were still openclarify what this means?
Will have more comments for the rest of the article soon. Elli (talk | contribs) 18:32, 11 April 2024 (UTC)
this transmitter, which was relied upon during the whole start-up operation, was not calibrated and its readings were not reliablethis is talking about the indicator that would be read to see if it's 99%, right? should be clarified
An independent level alarm triggered by a high-level switch should also have sounded at 7.9 feet (2.4 m) but failed to.is there a reason why this failed?
One of the two day-shift supervisors ("A") arrived late for work at the central control room and did not have a handover with the night shift.when were they supposed to arrive and when did they arrive?
(Immediately after the BP-Amoco merger, the decision was taken to eliminate a second board operator position).this might be better to include as a footnote.
The required temperature for the tower reboiler return flow was 135 °C (275 °F) at 10 °C (18 °F) per hour but the procedure was not followed. During this start-up, this return flow temperature reached 153 °C (307 °F) with a rate increase of 23 °C (41 °F) per hour.slightly:
The required temperature for the tower reboiler return flow was 135 °C (275 °F) with a rate increase of 10 °C (18 °F) per hour, but this procedure was not followed: during start-up, the return flow temperature reached 153 °C (307 °F) at a rate of 23 °C (41 °F) per hour.
The erroneous 93% reading from the defective level transmitterthe article only previously mentions the reading was "less than 100%", so this phrasing is a bit confusing. Also I'm maybe just missing something but if 93% would only be ~9 feet, then wouldn't 67 feet be way over 100%? The details of how this reading works could be clarified.
Meanwhile, at 12:00 pm contractors had left the trailers for a lunch organized to celebrate one month without lost-time injury. They were back by 1:00 pm.[52]this is ironic/amusing but not sure it's relevant in this location. Might be better somewhere else? Maybe in the second-to-last paragraph of this section.
level control valve was finally openedwhy?
by the subsequent fire that followed the violent explosion"subsequent" is redundant here.
of the date of publication of the report none had actually been sacked.any updates on this?
The director of the Cherry Point refinery was promoted to oversee better implementation of process safety at BP.has a cn tag and no source.
Process Safety Management or PSMusing a parenthetical here would be consistent with the rest of the article
the Contra Costa County, California own local regulatorthis isn't clear/proper grammar
In other congressional hearings dedicated to subsequent BP accidents in the U.S., the Texas City case history was consistently presented within the pattern of degraded safety culture at BP.a secondary source would be ideal for this but not necessary.
By August 2008 only one of the approximately 4,000 claims remained open.presumably this was eventually settled, right?
stepped up their gameis not really encyclopedic tone
Looks good.
Noting that while I did spot-check a few references, I did not do an in-depth source check as this article is quite long. A few general notes:
Sorry for how long this review took. In general I think you've done a lot of good work here, and this isn't too far off from being a GA. Putting this on hold for now to allow you to address everything; please let me know if you have any questions/concerns. Elli (talk | contribs) 23:13, 20 April 2024 (UTC)
After Pan American merged with Standard Oil of Indiana, ownership passed to Amoco.[2]This is worded a bit confusingly, maybe go with "Pan American merged with Standard Oil of Indiana in 1954 to form Amoco" or something similar.
but BP were extremely successful in turning the tideshouldn't this be "BP was"?
At the time of the merger, the plant was losing moneygiven that the previous paragraph mentions multiple mergers, maybe do "At the time of the 1999 merger"
It emerged after the accident that the plant had been poorly maintained for several years.[10]given what else is written in this section, it seems like this was known at the time as well.
The plant had been poorly maintained for several years.
Disposal of hydrocarbon vapors and small amounts of associated liquids from vent and relief during plant upsets or planned shutdowns was to vessel F-20, a blowdown stack.would reword -- maybe like "Excess hydrocarbon vapors and liquids were sent to vessel F-20, a blowdown stack."
Excess hydrocarbon vapors and liquids from vent and relief were sent to vessel F-20, a blowdown stack. I think it is important to leave the "vent and relief" to give context (for example, drained liquids did not go to the blowdown stack).
Construction, turnaround, and routine activities at the refinery often required the installation of trailers and portable buildings for use as offices, workshops, etc. for the use of employees and contract workers.would go with something more like "Portable buildings and trailers were often installed for use as offices during construction and maintenance."
established the agreed layout of trailers"agreed" with who?
established an acceptable layout of trailers, I hope it is more clear.
actions arising from the double-wide trailer MOC were still openclarify what this means?
recommendations issued in the analysis of the change involving the placement of the double-wide trailer were still open. I hope this clarifies.
Because plant start-ups are especially prone to unexpected situations, operational practice requires the application of a controlled and approved pre-start-up safety review (PSSR) procedure. BP had one, but it was not adopted in this case.
this transmitter, which was relied upon during the whole start-up operation, was not calibrated and its readings were not reliablethis is talking about the indicator that would be read to see if it's 99%, right? should be clarified.
The process control level transmitter was designed to indicate the raffinate level within a 5-foot (1.5 m) span from the bottom of the splitter tower to a 9-foot (2.7 m) level. A high-level alarm dependent on this transmitter sounded as intended when a level of 7.6 feet (2.3 m) from the bottom was reached. However, during start-up it was common to ignore this alarm and fill up to a level of 99% (as indicated by the transmitter) to prevent damage to the furnace heating the splitter bottom. Unbeknown to the operators, the process control level transmitter, which was used to monitor the level in the splitter during the whole start-up operation, was not calibrated and its readings were not reliable.
An independent level alarm triggered by a high-level switch should also have sounded at 7.9 feet (2.4 m) but failed to.is there a reason why this failed?
One of the two day-shift supervisors ("A") arrived late for work at the central control room and did not have a handover with the night shift.when were they supposed to arrive and when did they arrive?
At 7:15 am, more than one our late on the commencement of his shift (6:00 am), one of the two day-shift supervisors ("A") arrived at the central control room. Because of his lateness, he could not go through the required handover with the night shift.
(Immediately after the BP-Amoco merger, the decision was taken to eliminate a second board operator position).this might be better to include as a footnote.
The need for two operators, especially for dealing with potential plant upsets, had been highlighted in several reports since before the Amoco–BP merger., a bit more nuanced and consistent with the source supporting the statement).
The required temperature for the tower reboiler return flow was 135 °C (275 °F) at 10 °C (18 °F) per hour but the procedure was not followed. During this start-up, this return flow temperature reached 153 °C (307 °F) with a rate increase of 23 °C (41 °F) per hour.slightly:
The required temperature for the tower reboiler return flow was 135 °C (275 °F) with a rate increase of 10 °C (18 °F) per hour, but this procedure was not followed: during start-up, the return flow temperature reached 153 °C (307 °F) at a rate of 23 °C (41 °F) per hour.
The erroneous 93% reading from the defective level transmitterthe article only previously mentions the reading was "less than 100%", so this phrasing is a bit confusing. Also I'm maybe just missing something but if 93% would only be ~9 feet, then wouldn't 67 feet be way over 100%? The details of how this reading works could be clarified.
The defective level transmitter still erroneously indicated an ongoing safe level condition in the tower. However, there was still no flow of heavy raffinate from the splitter tower to the storage tank as the level control valve remained closed; instead of the hydrocarbon liquid level being at 8.65 feet (2.64 m), i.e. 93% of the instrument range, as indicated, it had actually reached 67 feet (20 m).I hope it is clearer.
Meanwhile, at 12:00 pm contractors had left the trailers for a lunch organized to celebrate one month without lost-time injury. They were back by 1:00 pm.[52]this is ironic/amusing but not sure it's relevant in this location. Might be better somewhere else? Maybe in the second-to-last paragraph of this section.
level control valve was finally openedwhy?
by the subsequent fire that followed the violent explosion"subsequent" is redundant here.
of the date of publication of the report none had actually been sacked.any updates on this?
The director of the Cherry Point refinery was promoted to oversee better implementation of process safety at BP.has a cn tag and no source.
Process Safety Management or PSMusing a parenthetical here would be consistent with the rest of the article
the Contra Costa County, California own local regulatorthis isn't clear/proper grammar
Contra Costa County, California hazardous materials programs(see www.cchealth.org/health-and-safety-information/hazardous-materials). I believe "<county>, <state> <thing>" is correct grammar to indicate a thing from a certain county in a certain state, or am I wrong?
In other congressional hearings dedicated to subsequent BP accidents in the U.S., the Texas City case history was consistently presented within the pattern of degraded safety culture at BP.a secondary source would be ideal for this but not necessary.
By August 2008 only one of the approximately 4,000 claims remained open.presumably this was eventually settled, right?
stepped up their gameis not really encyclopedic tone
took action
In other congressional hearings dedicated to subsequent BP accidents in the U.S., the Texas City case history was consistently presented within the pattern of degraded safety culture at BP.This sentence is the subject of one of your comments above. I did try to find a secondary source here but could not, so I think having citations of the primary sources to which the sentence alludes is the lesser evil.
The disaster had a notable impact in the domain of process safety. Texas City has become a classic case history used to explain failings in both management and technical barriers in process plants.These citations are to book chapters where Texas City is presented as a case history. I think having several citations here is useful, because they do not just support the statement they are appended to, but give a callback to important process safety books where Texas City is discussed in specific chapters or sections.
The accident had widespread consequences on both the company and the industry as a whole. The explosion was the first in a series of accidents (which culminated in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill) that seriously tarnished BP's reputation, especially in the U.S. The refinery was eventually sold as a result, together with other North American assets. In the meantime, the industry took action both through the issuance of new or updated standards and more radical regulatory oversight of refinery activities.I hope this is good.