Enterprise foundations are foundations that own companies.

Enterprise foundations are independent, self-governing entities with no owners. They are characterised by long time horizons, philanthropic goals and the absence of personal profit motives.[1] Enterprise foundations generally have philanthropic as well as business purposes, and often concentrate their investments in a single firm or a single business group. Many of the best known foundation-owned companies are publicly listed, while the enterprise foundation retains a controlling ownership position, commonly through voting rights via different share classes. Ownership can be full (100% ownership) or just a controlling influence. The companies owned by enterprise foundations may be active in any private business activity.

Other terms used to describe the same phenomenon are "industrial foundations", "corporate foundations", "commercial foundations", "business foundations", "commercial non-profits" and "foundations with corporate interests".

A defining feature of enterprise foundations is that the foundation controls the company which it owns, and not the other way around. Consequently, the majority of corporate foundations around the world, who do philanthropy on behalf of a company, are not enterprise foundations. Moreover, enterprise foundations are private entities not governmental or quasi-governmental institutions.

Several big international companies are owned by enterprise foundations, including the Indian Tata Group, the Swedish Wallenberg businesses, the Danish pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk, US Hershey, German Robert Bosch, Swiss Rolex and IKEA.[2] Enterprise foundations are most common in the Nordic country of Denmark, where enterprise foundations account for almost half of domestic stock market capitalisation.[2] In Denmark, enterprise foundations own three of the four largest Danish companies; A.P. Moller – Maersk (A.P. Moller Foundation), Novo Nordisk (Novo Nordisk Foundation) and Carlsberg (Carlsberg Foundation).[2]

Purpose

Many enterprise foundations are non-profits without a personal profit motive, which sets them aside from other ownership structures. Instead, they are legally bound by their purpose, which typically is to secure the longevity and independence of the companies that they own and to contribute to society by philanthropy. As perpetuities which cannot be dissolved, they are long-term owners. However, not all enterprise foundations are equally idealistic. Some have strong ties to the founding family and continue to donate to its descendants. Others again have ties to government organisations, cooperatives or associations, which helped establish them.[1]

Distribution

In most countries around the world, enterprise foundations are not a legal category and there is no unified body of enterprise foundation law.[2][3] The Nordic country of Denmark is an outlier due to its tax regime and enterprise foundation laws. Consequently, Denmark has a high number of enterprise foundations compared to other countries.[2]

Examples of significant, international companies controlled by an enterprise foundation[2]
Company Country Description and industry
Carlsberg Denmark Alcoholic beverages, beer and soft drinks
Novo Nordisk Denmark Danish multinational pharmaceutical company
Anheuser Busch Inbev Belgium Alcoholic beverages, beer and soft drinks
A.P. Moller – Maersk Denmark Global transport and logistics company
Bertelsmann Germany German multinational media, services and education company
Lundbeck Denmark Danish multinational pharmaceutical company
Robert Bosch Germany German conglomerate
Leo Pharma Denmark Danish multinational pharmaceutical company
CaixaBank Spain Spanish multinational financial services company
Novozymes Denmark Danish multinational biotech company
Carl Zeiss Germany German optics company
The Hershey Co. United States American food company
Inter IKEA Holding Sweden Swedish furniture manufacturer
Wallenberg Sweden Swedish conglomerate and business dynasty
Kavli Norway Norwegian food company
Kuehne + Nagel Switzerland Global transport and logistics company
Lloyds Register United Kingdom Technical and business services organisation
Mahle Germany German automotive parts manufacturer
DNV Norway Certification body and classification society
Pierre Fabre France French multinational pharmaceutical and cosmetics company.
Rolex Switzerland Swiss watch designer and manufacturer
Tata Sons India Indian multinational conglomerate
Wiliam Demant Denmark Danish multinational hearing healthcare company

Characteristics

If a foundation has controlling influence in a business company, it is an enterprise foundation.[2]

Business ownership separates enterprise foundations from ordinary (purely charitable) foundations. Self-ownership means that it has no residual claimants. The foundation may choose to donate, but nobody has a claim on donations. By foundation ownership, foundations have controlling influence in a business company. To qualify as enterprise foundations, they have to have controlling influence – enterprise foundations do not have to own 100% of the companies. The controlling influence is focused on voting rights rather than capital shares or dividend rights.

Types

Key characteristics

Academic literature has identified the following key characteristics of enterprise foundations:[2]

Perspectives

Advantages and disadvantages to enterprise foundations and foundation ownership:

Advantages (benefits, strengths) Disadvantages (costs, weaknesses)
Long-term horizon[4][2] Muted incentives[5][2]
Ownership commitment[4][2] Risk aversion[6][2]
Social responsibility[7][8][2] Financial constraints[6][2]
Philanthropy[9][2] No market for corporate control[6][2]
Succession[9][2] Multiple objectives (business, philanthropy)[2][10]
Company survival[4][2] Company growth[6][2]

Key benefits of enterprise foundation structure

Long-term commitment

Trust and goodwill

Mitigation of succession challenges

Absence of monetary motive

Criticism of enterprise foundation structure

References

  1. ^ a b "What is an Enterprise Foundation? – Enterprise Foundations" (in Danish). Retrieved 15 August 2022.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab Thomsen, Steen; Kavadis, Nikolaos (8 March 2022). "Enterprise Foundations: Law, Taxation, Governance, and Performance". Annals of Corporate Governance. 6 (4): 227–333. doi:10.1561/109.00000031. ISSN 2381-6724. S2CID 247373467.
  3. ^ Schroeder, David. "Publicly listed foundation-owned firms around the world: an overview" (PDF). Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School.
  4. ^ a b c d e f Thomsen, Steen; Poulsen, Thomas; Børsting, Christa; Kuhn, Johan (25 April 2018). "Industrial foundations as long-term owners". Corporate Governance: An International Review. 26 (3): 180–196. doi:10.1111/corg.12236. hdl:10398/2fee4ba1-c713-4951-9086-f3769cd19129. ISSN 0964-8410. S2CID 197776483.
  5. ^ Fama, Eugene F.; Jensen, Michael C. (June 1983). "Agency Problems and Residual Claims". The Journal of Law and Economics. 26 (2): 327–349. doi:10.1086/467038. ISSN 0022-2186. S2CID 151111003.
  6. ^ a b c d Fama, Eugene F.; Jensen, Michael C. (March 1985). "Organizational forms and investment decisions". Journal of Financial Economics. 14 (1): 101–119. doi:10.1016/0304-405x(85)90045-5. ISSN 0304-405X.
  7. ^ Børsting, Christa; Thomsen, Steen (2017). "Foundation ownership, reputation, and labour". Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 33 (2): 317–338. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grx023. ISSN 0266-903X.
  8. ^ Thomsen, Steen (October 1996). "Foundation Ownership and Economic Performance1". Corporate Governance: An International Review. 4 (4): 212–221. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.1996.tb00150.x. ISSN 0964-8410.
  9. ^ a b c Amstrup, Niels (1 January 1997). "Henrik Holtermann (ed.), Denmark in International Affairs. Publications in languages other than Danish 1967–1995, København: DUPI og DJØF forlag, 1997, 230 s., 525,00 kr". Politica. 29 (4): 446. doi:10.7146/politica.v29i4.68173. ISSN 2246-042X.
  10. ^ Jensen, Michael (September 2001). "Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function". European Financial Management. 7 (3): 297–317. doi:10.1111/1468-036x.00158. ISSN 1354-7798.
  11. ^ Mayer, Colin (21 April 2021). "The Future of the Corporation and the Economics of Purpose". Journal of Management Studies. 58 (3): 887–901. doi:10.1111/joms.12660. ISSN 0022-2380. S2CID 226329929.
  12. ^ Bennedsen, M.; Nielsen, K. M.; Perez-Gonzalez, F.; Wolfenzon, D. (1 May 2007). "Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 122 (2): 647–691. doi:10.1162/qjec.122.2.647. ISSN 0033-5533.
  13. ^ Hansmann, Henry B. (April 1980). "The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise". The Yale Law Journal. 89 (5): 835–901. doi:10.2307/796089. ISSN 0044-0094. JSTOR 796089.
  14. ^ Henderson, Rebecca; Steen, Eric Van den (1 May 2015). "Why Do Firms Have "Purpose"? The Firm's Role as a Carrier of Identity and Reputation". American Economic Review. 105 (5): 326–330. doi:10.1257/aer.p20151072. ISSN 0002-8282. S2CID 153746145.
  15. ^ Dherbécourt, Clément (June 2011). "George A. Akerlof et Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics. How our Identities Shape our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2010". OEconomia. 2011 (2): 327. doi:10.4074/s2113520711012114. ISSN 2113-5207.
  16. ^ "From CSR 'greenwashing' to general 'SDG washing': the potential threat to SDG implementation | Emerald Publishing". www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com. Retrieved 16 August 2022.
  17. ^ "Insulin maker Novo Nordisk walks moral tightrope". Financial Times. 1 October 2019. Retrieved 16 August 2022.