The Ming succession dispute (simplified Chinese: 国本之争; traditional Chinese: 國本之爭; pinyin: Guóběn Zhīzhēng, or simplified Chinese: 争国本; traditional Chinese: 爭國本; pinyin: Zhēng Guóběn, lit. 'dispute over the foundation of the state'), between 1586 and 1614, was a conflict between the Wanli Emperor and a significant portion of Ming officials. The disagreement centered around the appointment of the crown prince. While officials argued for the legal principle of primogeniture and the appointment of the emperor's eldest son, Zhu Changluo, as crown prince, the emperor seemed to favor Zhu Changxun, the son of his favorite concubine, Lady Zheng, as his successor. Despite pressure from officials, the emperor delayed making a decision until 1601, when he finally named Zhu Changluo as his successor and Zhu Changxun as the prince. However, the emperor kept Zhu Changxun in Beijing until 1614, when he was supposed to be sent to his regional seat after turning eighteen in 1604. This raised suspicions about the emperor's intentions and sparked further protests from opposition officials.

The dispute resurfaced in 1615 with the "Case of the Wooden Staff Assault" (梃擊案), which was possibly an attempt to assassinate Zhu Changluo.

In the political terminology of that time, the crown prince was referred to as the "foundation of the state" (simplified Chinese: 国本; traditional Chinese: 國本; pinyin: Guóběn).

Dispute

In 1586, the issue of succession arose when the emperor elevated his favorite concubine, Lady Zheng, to the title of "Imperial Noble Consort" (Huang Guifei) after she gave birth to a son.[1][2] This placed her one rank below Empress Wang and above all other concubines, including Lady Wang, who was the mother of the emperor's eldest son Zhu Changluo (1582–1620). This decision made it clear to those around him that he favored the son of Lady Zheng Zhu Changxun (1586–1641)—his third son (the second son had died in infancy)—as his successor, rather than Zhu Changluo. As a result, the bureaucracy became divided; some officials argued for the rights of the first son based on legal primogeniture, while others aligned themselves with the promotion of Lady Zheng's son.[2]

The emperor, despite his autocratic rule, did not possess legislative authority and was limited in his ability to make autonomous decisions. As a result, he lacked the power to alter the rules of succession.[3] In response to the widespread support for the rights of the eldest son among officials, he chose to delay the decision and did not appoint either the first-born or the younger son as his successor.[2]

In 1589, the emperor agreed to appoint his eldest son as his successor. However, Lady Zheng opposed this decision, causing a wave of mutual accusations and arrests two years later when a pamphlet was circulated in Beijing accusing her of conspiring against the emperor's eldest son with some high officials. The emperor, on the other hand, tried to portray Lady Zheng in a positive light to the public.[1] His efforts reached a peak in 1594 when he supported her aid to the victims of a famine in Henan by ordering all officials of the fifth rank and above in Beijing to contribute to her from their incomes.[4] The emperor justified the delay in appointing a successor by waiting for a son from the empress.[5] However, the failure to appoint a successor caused protests from high officials, including Grand Secretaries Shen Shixing (in office 1578–91) and Wang Xijue (in office 1584–91 and 1593–94).[2] Even the Wanli Emperor's mother, Empress Dowager Li, supported Zhu Changluo's succession. When the emperor objected, stating that his eldest son was the son of a mere palace servant, Empress Dowager Li replied that the Wanli Emperor was also the son of a mere servant.[5] Critics argued that this succession case revealed the Wanli Emperor's inability to fulfill the duties of a monarch.[3] Empress Dowager Li's public and behind-the-scenes support of the empress and Lady Wang countered the emperor's support of Lady Zheng. At the same time, the empress dowager relied on Ming law, which considered the appointment of the crown prince a family matter. As the emperor's mother, Lady Li had the final and decisive say. Over time, a group formed around Lady Li, supporting her interests and those of the emperor's eldest son. This group consisted of high-ranking officials, prominent Buddhist monks, rank-and-file officials, and even some eunuchs.[6] The followers of the empress and her son feared for her safety, as they believed that after her death, the emperor could appoint Lady Zheng as the new empress. In this scenario, her son would legally become the successor as the son of the empress.[6]

When Zhu Changluo turned eight years old in 1590, officials insisted that he be appointed as successor so that his education, which typically began at the age of six, could officially commence. They used the example of the Wanli Emperor, who had also been appointed as successor as a child, to support their argument. However, the Wanli Emperor defended himself by stating that princes were traditionally taught by eunuchs.[7] Despite this, in 1591, the emperor, under pressure from officials, finally agreed to appoint a successor within two years. However, the opposition, fearing further delays, demanded that Zhu Changluo's teaching and preparations for his appointment begin immediately. This request was met with anger from the monarch, who refused to comply.[8]

In the 1590s, Lady Zheng publicly promoted her son as the heir to the throne. This was evident in the stelae erected in Beijing's Dongyue Taoist Temple (early 1592) and Sanyang abbey on Mount Tai (1594 and 1596), where her son was referred to as the taizi, or crown prince. Empress Wang and Lady Wang also sought supernatural assistance, but through Buddhist means. In 1592, Empress Wang financially supported the publication of a book of prayers to Guanyin, the most popular bodhisattva among women. Additionally, with the support of Empress Dowager Li, she financed the reconstruction of Buddhist monasteries. Steles and inscriptions were also erected, asking for favors for the emperor's first-born son and mentioning Lady Wang.[6]

In 1593, officials were eagerly anticipating whether or not the monarch would fulfill the promise made in 1591. The emperor, instead of appointing an heir, suggested to Grand Secretary Wang Xijue that he appoint his three living sons as princes, in accordance with the law, and wait to see if the empress would bear a son. Wang drafted the edict and sent it to the Ministry of Rites to begin preparations. However, critics opposed the idea, arguing that the eldest son should be appointed crown prince instead of prince. This forced Wang Xijue to apologize to the emperor, admitting that the appointment of three princes would go against the law, which he had not previously realized. As a result, the emperor abandoned the idea of appointing his sons as princes, but declared that he would not appoint a successor in the next two to three years.[9]

In 1599, on Zhu Changluo's eighteenth birthday, there was a surge of requests for his appointment as crown prince. In response, the emperor demanded that the Ministry of Revennue collect 24 million liang of silver to cover the expenses of the ceremonies for naming the successor and his other sons. This was a blatant obstruction from the emperor,[10] as the requested amount far exceeded the ministry's annual income in silver and was equivalent to the state's annual income in both silver and goods.

In 1601, after much persuasion, the monarch finally agreed to appoint his eldest son as successor and his four younger sons as princes. However, the emperor attempted to delay the promulgation of the edict, but Senior Grand Secretary Shen Yiguan stood firm and did not back down. Eventually, in November 1601, the emperor officially appointed his eldest son as successor and his four younger sons as princes.[10] One of the younger sons, Zhu Changxun, was given the title of Prince of Fu,[3] but he remained in Beijing instead of being sent to the province as was expected when he turned eighteen in 1604. This fueled rumors that the question of succession was still open.[11] It wasn't until 1614, after a long series of appeals and protests against inactivity, that the emperor finally sent the prince to his provincial seat.[12][13] During one of the protests, Lady Zheng argued that the prince should stay in Beijing to care for Empress Dowager Li and attend her birthday celebrations the following year. In response, the empress dowager summoned her younger son, Zhu Yiliu, Prince of Lu, to Beijing. This decision was seen as a challenge to the emperor, as it was considered inappropriate and risky for the princes to stay in the capital as alternative heirs who could potentially oppose the crown prince.[5] In the end, the emperor backed down.[5]

Case of 1615

The "Case of the Wooden Staff Assault" (梃擊案) was a significant event in the succession debates that damaged the monarch's prestige.

In late May 1615, a man carrying a wooden staff was arrested at the successor's palace. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the man's name was Zhang Chai (張差) and he was mentally unstable.[14] He had intended to use the wooden staff to resolve a conflict with two palace eunuchs with whom he had a disagreement. Initially, it was decided that the man would be executed and the case would be closed.[15] However, prison official Wang Zhicai (王之寀) intervened and pushed for a public investigation involving officials from the Ministry of Justice. This new version of the case suggested that the man was mentally sound and had been sent by two eunuchs close to Lady Zheng and her brother to assassinate the heir and install Lady Zheng's son in his place.[16] This caused a stir at court and the Wanli Emperor took the unprecedented step of summoning civil and military officials employed by the Beijing authorities. He appeared before them—the emperor's first meeting with "outer court" officials since 1602[17]—along with Zhu Changluo and his family (sons and daughter), and expressed his anger at their doubts about his relationship with the heir, whom he trusted and relied on. Zhu Changluo confirmed his close relationship with his father and urged an end to the whole affair. The emperor ultimately decided to execute Zhang Chai and the two eunuchs involved in the case,[18] despite opposition from representatives of the Ministry of Justice who demanded further investigation. A compromise was reached with the help of the Grand Secretaries, in which Zhang Chai was executed the next day and the suspected eunuchs were to be interrogated. However, the interrogation was conducted under the watch of the emperor's eunuchs and on the fifth day after the emperor's speech, officials were informed that the suspects had died.[16] The case then fell silent.

References

Citations

  1. ^ a b Brook (2010), p. 101.
  2. ^ a b c d Huang (1988), p. 516.
  3. ^ a b c Huang (1988), p. 517.
  4. ^ Brook (2010), p. 102.
  5. ^ a b c d McMahon (2016), p. 130.
  6. ^ a b c Zhang (2020), pp. 63–64.
  7. ^ Duindam (2016), pp. 63–64.
  8. ^ Zhao (2002), p. 131.
  9. ^ Zhao (2002), pp. 131–134.
  10. ^ a b Goodrich & Fang (1976), pp. 1179–1182.
  11. ^ Huang (1988), p. 550.
  12. ^ Dardess (2002), p. 9.
  13. ^ Huang (1988), p. 517 and 550.
  14. ^ Dardess (2002), p. 10.
  15. ^ Huang (1988), p. 554.
  16. ^ a b Huang (1988), p. 555.
  17. ^ Dardess (2002), p. 14.
  18. ^ Dardess (2002), p. 15.

Works cited

  • Brook, Timothy (2010). The troubled empire: China in the Yuan and Ming dynasties. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-04602-3.
  • Huang, Ray (1988). "The Lung-ch'ing and Wan-li reigns, 1567—1620". In Twitchett, Denis C; Mote, Frederick W. (eds.). The Cambridge History of China Volume 7: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 511–584. ISBN 0521243335.
  • McMahon, Keith (2016). Celestial Women: Imperial Wives and Concubines in China from Song to Qing. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9781442255029.
  • Zhang, Dewei (2020). Thriving in Crisis: Buddhism and Political Disruption in China, 1522–1620 (1 ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Duindam, Jeroen (2016). Dynasties: A Global History of Power, 1300-1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107637580.
  • Zhao, Jie (2002). "A Decade of Considerable Significance: Late-Ming Factionalism in the Making, 1583-1593". T'oung Pao. Second Series. 88 (1/3): 112–150. doi:10.1163/156853202320465404.
  • Goodrich, L. Carington; Fang, Chaoying (1976). Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644. Vol. 2, M–Z. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-03801-1.
  • Dardess, John W (2002). Blood and History in China: The Donglin Faction and Its Repression, 1620-1627. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 9780824825164.
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