Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee | |
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Argued January 12–13, 1933 Decided March 13, 1933 | |
Full case name | Louis K. Liggett Co., et al. v. Lee, Comptroller, et al. |
Citations | 288 U.S. 517 (more) |
Case history | |
Prior | Appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Roberts, joined by Hughes, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler |
Dissent | Brandeis |
Dissent | Cardozo, joined by Stone |
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933), is a corporate law decision from the United States Supreme Court.[1]
In his opinion, Justice Brandeis endorsed the theories that state corporate law, and lack of federal standards, enabled a race to the bottom in corporate law rules, or one of "laxity". He also expounded the evidence that the Great Depression was caused by disparities of income and wealth brought about by the corporation, which he likened to Frankenstein's monster.
The case involved retail business taxes in the Florida being based on the number of stores and not the value or sales of the stores.
The majority of the Supreme Court, with the opinion delivered by Roberts J, held that § 5 of the Florida Act, which increased tax if stores were present in more than one county, was unreasonable and arbitrary and violated the equal protection clause.
Justice Brandeis dissented. He agreed with the race to the bottom theory of corporate law, proposed by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
(b) Limitations upon the scope of a business corporation's powers and activity were also long universal. At first, corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited number of purposes — usually those which required a relatively large fixed capital, like transportation, banking, and insurance, and mechanical, mining, and manufacturing enterprises.[2] Permission to incorporate for "any lawful purpose"[3] was not common until 1875; and until that time the duration of corporate franchises was generally limited to a period of 20, 30, or 50 years.[4] All, or a majority, of the incorporators or directors, or both, were required to be residents of the incorporating state.[5] The powers which the corporation might exercise in carrying out its purposes were sparingly conferred and strictly construed. Severe limitations were imposed on the amount of indebtedness, bonded or otherwise.[6] The power to hold stock in other corporations was not conferred or implied.[7] The holding company was impossible.
(c) The removal by the leading industrial States of the limitations upon the size and powers of business corporations appears to have been due, not to their conviction that maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable in itself, but to the conviction that it was futile to insist upon them; because local restriction would be circumvented by foreign incorporation. Indeed, local restriction seemed worse than futile. Lesser States, eager for the revenue[8] derived from the traffic in charters, had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws.[9] Companies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in states where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive.[10] The states joined in advertising their wares.[11] The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.[12] Incorporation under such laws was possible; and the great industrial States yielded in order not to lose wholly the prospect of the revenue and the control incident to domestic incorporation.
The history of the changes made by New York is illustrative. The New York revision of 1890, which eliminated the maximum limitation on authorized capital, and permitted intercorporate stockholding in a limited class of cases,[13] was passed after a migration of incorporation from New York, attracted by the more liberal incorporation laws of New Jersey.[14] But the changes made by New York in 1890 were not sufficient to stem the tide.[15] In 1892, the Governor of New York approved a special charter for the General Electric Company, modelled upon the New Jersey Act, on the ground that otherwise the enterprise would secure a New Jersey charter.[16] Later in the same year the New York corporation law was again revised, allowing the holding of stock in other corporations.[17] But the New Jersey law still continued to be more attractive to incorporators.[18] By specifically providing that corporations might be formed in New Jersey to do all their business elsewhere,[19] the state made its policy unmistakably clear. Of the seven largest trusts existing in 1904, with an aggregate capitalization of over two and a half billion dollars, all were organized under New Jersey law; and three of these were formed in 1899.[20] During the first seven months of that year, 1336 corporations were organized under the laws of New Jersey, with an aggregate authorized capital of over two billion dollars.[21] The Comptroller of New York, in his annual report for 1899, complained that "our tax list reflects little of the great wave of organization that has swept over the country during the past year and to which this state contributed more capital than any other state in the Union." "It is time," he declared, "that great corporations having their actual headquarters in this State and a nominal office elsewhere, doing nearly all of their business within our borders, should be brought within the jurisdiction of this State not only as to matters of taxation but in respect to other and equally important affairs."[22] In 1901 the New York corporation law was again revised.[23]
The history in other states was similar. Thus, the Massachusetts revision of 1903 was precipitated by the fact that "the possibilities of incorporation in other states have become well known, and have been availed of to the detriment of this Commonwealth."[24]
Third. Able, discerning scholars[25] have pictured for us the economic and social results of thus removing all limitations upon the size and activities of business corporations and of vesting in their managers vast powers once exercised by stockholders — results not designed by the States and long unsuspected. They show that size alone gives to giant corporations a social significance not attached ordinarily to smaller units of private enterprise. Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool employed by individuals in the conduct of private business, have become an institution — an institution which has brought such concentration of economic power that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the State. The typical business corporation of the last century, owned by a small group of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in size by their personal wealth, is being supplanted by huge concerns in which the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of employees and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are subjected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few men. Ownership has been separated from control; and this separation has removed many of the checks which formerly operated to curb the misuse of wealth and power. And as ownership of the shares is becoming continually more dispersed, the power which formerly accompanied ownership is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. The changes thereby wrought in the lives of the workers, of the owners and of the general public, are so fundamental and far-reaching as to lead these scholars to compare the evolving "corporate system" with the feudal system; and to lead other men of insight and experience to assert that this "master institution of civilised life" is committing it to the rule of a plutocracy.[26]
The data submitted in support of these conclusions indicate that in the United States the process of absorption has already advanced so far that perhaps two-thirds of our industrial wealth has passed from individual possession to the ownership of large corporations whose shares are dealt in on the stock exchange;[27] that 200 non-banking corporations, each with assets in excess of $90,000,000, control directly about one-fourth of all our national wealth, and that their influence extends far beyond the assets under their direct control;[28] that these 200 corporations, while nominally controlled by about 2,000 directors, are actually dominated by a few hundred persons[29] — the negation of industrial democracy. Other writers have shown that, coincident with the growth of these giant corporations, there has occurred a marked concentration of individual wealth;[30] and that the resulting disparity in incomes is a major cause of the existing depression.[31] Such is the Frankenstein monster which States have created by their corporation laws.[32]
Fourth. Among these 200 corporations, each with assets in excess of $90,000,000, are five of the plaintiffs. These five have in the aggregate, $820,000,000 of assets;[33] and they operate, in the several States, an aggregate of 19,718 stores.[34] A single one of these giants operates nearly 16,000.[35] Against these plaintiffs, and other owners of multiple stores, the individual retailers of Florida are engaged in a struggle to preserve their independence — perhaps a struggle for existence. The citizens of the State, considering themselves vitally interested in this seemingly unequal struggle, have undertaken to aid the individual retailers by subjecting the owners of multiple stores to the handicap of higher license fees. They may have done so merely in order to preserve competition. But their purpose may have been a broader and deeper one. They may have believed that the chain store, by furthering the concentration of wealth and of power and by promoting absentee ownership, is thwarting American ideals; that it is making impossible equality of opportunity; that it is converting independent tradesmen into clerks; and that it is sapping the resources, the vigor and the hope of the smaller cities and towns.[36]